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1. Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and human rights: An introduc-
tion to the debate 
 
Novelists and filmmakers have been speculating on the interaction 
between human beings and robots for years. Isaac Asimov, in particular, 
devoted an important part of his bibliography to the issue. He created a 
world where robots are integrated in our society and regulated by the 
famous three laws of robotics: ‘1) A robot may not injure a human being 
or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; 2) A robot 
must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law; 3) A robot must protect its own exist-
ence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second 
Laws.’1 
Witnessing that the scenario depicted by Asimov is becoming a real-
ity is a strange feeling. It is even more strange to notice that the three laws 
he elaborated in his novels sound tremendously topical2 in the present-
day debate on the legal and ethical issues raised by the use of autonomous 
weapon systems (AWS). A debate3 that is for its largest part focused on 
 
* Research Fellow in International Law, Department of Law, University of Turin; 
Adjunct Professor of International Law, University of Piemonte Orientale. 
1 I Asimov, I, Robot (Gnome Press 1950) 40. 
2 Far from being a whimsy reference, Asimov was quoted by Angela Kane, United 
Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs: ‘we should all keep in mind “The 
Three Laws of Robotics” put forward by Isaac Asimov back in 1942’. A Kane, ‘Killer 
Robots and the Rule of Law’, A view from the United Nations, available at 
<www.huffingtonpost.com/A-View-from-the-United-Nations-/killer-robots-and-the-rul 
_b_3599657.html>. 
3 See ex multis P Alston, ‘Lethal Robotic Technologies: The Implications for Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 21 J Law, Information and Science 
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the use of AWS during the course of an armed conflict as this is the field 
in which the technological evolution is the most sensitive and already be-
ing applied.4  
The (potential) use of AWS in the context of armed conflict has at-
tracted not only the attention of scholars and practitioners but also that 
of institutions and civil society networks and organizations, in particular 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
A discussion on AWS was held at the Fifth Review Conference of the 
Member States of the United Nations (UN) Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW). As an outcome of that Conference, an open-ended 
Group of Governmental Experts was established with the aim of discuss-
ing legal issues related to the use of AWS which an informal meeting of 
experts had already identified in 2016.5 Such legal issues range from the 
compatibility of the use of AWS with international humanitarian law 
(IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and all related compli-
ance issues, to more ethical and moral ones.6 Although the meeting itself 
was cancelled due to insufficient State funding,7 the topic will remain on 
the agenda, if only because NGOs continue to push toward this end. 
 
35; M Wagner, ‘Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 9 J Law, Information and Science 155; Id., ‘The 
Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political 
Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt J Transnational L 
1371; MN Schmitt, JS Thurner, ‘“Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2013) 1 Harvard National Security J 231; WH Boothby, 
‘Autonomous Attack – Opportunity or Spectre?’ (2013) YB Intl Humanitarian L 71; Id., 
Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (2ndnd ed, OUP 2016) 247 ff and 252 ff.   
4 R McLaughlin, H Nasu, ‘Introduction: Conundrum of New Technologies in the 
Law of Armed Conflict’, in R McLaughlin, H Nasu (eds), New Technologies and the Law 
of Armed Conflict (TMC Asser Press 2014) 1, 2. 
5 Final document of the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects (12-16 December 2016) CCW/CONF.V/10, Decision 1. 
6 ibid 9. 
7 Letter of the Chairperson of the 2017 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to 
the Convention, Ambassador Matthew Rowland of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (dated 6 June 2017), on behalf of all the CCW officeholders 
concerning the announcement of the cancellation of meetings, available at 
<www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/3D20EDEBBF0E6B68C125813A00
566285/$file/Letter_CCW+MSP+Chairperson_6Jun2017.pdf>; see also R Crootof, F 
Renz, ‘An Opportunity to Change the Conversation on Autonomous Weapon Systems’ 
Lawfare (15 June 2017) <www.lawfareblog.com/opportunity-change-conversation-
autonomous-weapon-systems>. 
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Indeed, in 2013 a campaign named ‘Stop Killer Robots’8 was 
launched by a group of NGOs headed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
which had the merit of introducing the debate by publishing a report 
jointly with the Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights 
Clinic.9 The campaign is focused on achieving a complete ban on the use 
of AWS or, at least, the introduction of a requirement for meaningful 
human control over such weapons. Recently, in August 2017,10 Elon 
Musk, the founder of Tesla, and the famous Stephen Hawking joined a 
group of experts working in artificial intelligence (AI) in advocating a 
complete ban through an open letter addressed to the United Nations.11 
They warned that AWS ‘will permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale 
greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can comprehend. 
These can be weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use 
against innocent populations, and weapons hacked to behave in undesir-
able ways.’12 
Scholars and experts, however, are not unanimous in calling for a ban 
on AWS.  
It is true that some of them opine that a preemptive ban is the only 
way of addressing the legal and ethical problems that the use of AWS 
might raise. As seen before, this is the position maintained by proponents 
of the campaign ‘Stop Killer Robots’; it is also supported by a variety of 
scholars.13 The key points of this position are grounded on both ethical 
and legal reasons. It suffices here to say that AWS are deemed to be unfit 
to cope with the extreme variety of situations that might arise in the 
course of an armed conflict and, in particular, they would not be able to 
 
8 For more information see the website <www.stopkillerrobots.org>. 
9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights 
Clinic (IHRC), ‘Losing Humanity. The Case Against Killer Robots’ (19 November 2012) 
<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf>. 
10 See S Gibbs, ‘Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots’, 
The Guardian (20 August 2017) available at <www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-
war>. 
11 Future of Life Institute, ‘An Open Letter to the United Nations Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons’ (21 August 2017) The text of the open letter is available 
here: <https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017>. 
12 ibid. 
13 For a review of the pro-ban scholarly arguments see the paper by D Amoroso, pub-
lished in this Zoom-in. See also D Amoroso, G Tamburrini, ‘The ethical and legal case 
against autonomy in weapon systems’ (2017) Global Jurist 1 ff. 
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comply with the principle of humanity, a cornerstone of IHL. Moreover, 
in complex scenarios, conduct performed by AWS could hardly be com-
patible with the principle of proportionality, which requires a careful as-
sessment that could not be foreseen by an algorithm.14 Moreover, and 
from the perspective of jus ad bellum, it is also said that the use of AWS 
would inevitably lead States to increase their resort to military action, as 
this would be at no cost in terms of human casualties.15 
According to a second opinion, calling on a ban on AWS is somehow 
unrealistic. Some scholars and practitioners, in fact, maintain that, as 
AWS are here to stay, the best way to limit the potential negative impact 
of these weapons is to push for international regulation.16 Such an idea 
rests on the assumption that it is not reasonable to argue that technolog-
ical evolution would never put at the disposal of States’ Armies AWS 
which are equipped to respect the principle of distinction.17  Some schol-
ars are even more radical as they contend that it is wrong to argue that 
humans are better than machines in conducting hostilities.18 Others 
maintain that a ban is dangerous as it would impede the evolution of a 
new normative framework, given that the existing one is unfit to cope 
with legal problems arising from the use of AWS.19  
The debate I have tried to summarize so far is mainly shaped on the 
compatibility of AWS and/or the use of AWS with IHL and is deeply 
 
14 See accordingly M Sassoli, ‘Can Autonomous Weapon Systems Respect the 
Principles of Distinction, Proportionality and Precaution?’, in ICRC, ‘Autonomous 
weapon systems: Technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects. Expert meeting, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 March 2014’ available at <www.icrc.org/en/download/ 
file/1707/4221-002-autonomous-weapons-systems-full-report.pdf> 41 ff, 42-43. 
15 See again the arguments put forward by Daniele Amoroso. 
16 See for example K Anderson, MC Waxman, ‘Debating Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law’, in R Brownsword, 
E Scotford, K Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology 
(OUP 2017) 1097 ff. 
17 See for example M Sassoli (n 14) 41, who maintains that the real problem lies with 
the respect of the principles of proportionality and precaution, but the possibility  cannot 
be excluded that AWS will respect the principle of distinction. Accordingly see R Crotoff, 
‘The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’ (2015) 36 Cardozo L Rev 
1837. 
18 See accordingly MN Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics’ (2013) 1 Harvard National Security J 1 ff. See 
also and again K Anderson, MC Waxman (n 16) 1114. 
19 See R Crotoff, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Limits of Analogy’, in C 
Finkelstein, D MacIntosh, JD Ohlin (eds), The Ethics of Autonomous Weapon Systems, 
2017 (forthcoming) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820727>. 
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explored by Daniele Amoroso in his piece to this Zoom-in. The compat-
ibility with IHRL, on the contrary, is nowadays largely unexplored. One 
can easily count an article20 written by Christopher Heyns, former United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary exe-
cutions, who deserves the credit of bringing the topic to the attention of 
the Human Rights Council in his 2013 Annual Report.21 The present Spe-
cial Rapporteur, Agnes Callamard, dealt with the use of AWS in her 2016 
Report to the General Assembly, although she did not directly touch on 
the compatibility of these weapons with IHRL.22 HRW, on the contrary, 
published a report on this peculiar issue in 201423 and the European Par-
liament commissioned a study that was authored and published by Nils 
Melzer, a section of which is dedicated to the compatibility of AWS with 
IHRL.24 
The reason for the scarcity of scholarly works and research papers on 
the compatibility of AWS with IHRL is probably to be found in an ap-
parent lack of practice in the use of AWS outside the context of an armed 
conflict.  Moreover, it must be said that, contrary to IHL, IHRL does not 
contain specific limitations on the use of weapons.25  
States are nonetheless limited in choosing means and methods for law 
enforcement activities by the standards flowing from the rules enshrined 
in human rights treaties and elaborated upon by the jurisprudence of in-
ternational and regional human rights bodies.26 
 
20 See C Heyns, ‘Human Rights and the Use of Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement’ (2016) 38 Human Rights Quarterly 350 ff. 
21 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Christof Heyns’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/47, 16, paras 82-85. 
22 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/372, 13. 
23 HRW, ‘Shaking the Foundations. The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots’ 
(12 May 2014) available at <www.hrw.org/report/2014/05/12/shaking-
foundations/human-rights-implications-killer-robots>. 
24 N Melzer, ‘Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots 
in Warfare’ EXPO/B/DROI/2012/12 (May 2013) available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI_ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf>. 
25 See accordingly C Heyns (n 20) 353-354. 
26 This has constantly been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR) in its case-law. See eg Ergi v Turkey App no 66/1997/850/1057 (ECtHR (GC), 28 
July 1998) para 79; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 
and 57949/00 (ECtHR (GC) 24 February 2005) paras 195–200. 
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In this article, I would like to analyze the way in which the future 
introduction of AWS will impact on the content, the nature and the ex-
tent of States’ human rights obligations. 
In section 2 I will first discuss that the use of AWS in domestic law 
enforcement operations is far from being the starting scene of a sci-fi 
movie, as States are more and more inclined to take the benefit of this 
option in other-than-war scenarios. In section 3 I will introduce a broad 
perspective showing that the use of AWS could trigger a negative ‘cas-
cade effect’ on the whole catalogue of human rights.  
After having presented the scenario, I will develop an analysis of the 
implications that the use of AWS might have on the nature and scope of 
States’ obligations in relation to the right to life and the right to privacy. 
In particular, in sections 4 and 5, I will scrutinize the impact of AWS on 
the right to life, both in its negative and its positive dimension. In sections 
6 I will advocate that a massive use of AWS outside the context of armed 
conflicts will induce States to limit the right to privacy of individuals and 
that, therefore, such a use must also be subject to the standards flowing 
from the rules protecting that right. In conclusion, I will try to show that 
States are called, under IHRL, to provide more transparency in the evo-
lution of automated systems, but that this could not be enough to comply 
with human rights obligations. 
 
 
2. The use of AWS in domestic law enforcement: state of the art and pos-
sible future developments 
 
A preliminary section is needed to understand the potential for the 
use of AWS outside armed conflict in domestic law enforcement opera-
tions. As aforementioned, this scenario is still a primitive one, but is going 
to become reality in the near future, therefore it is worth exploring the 
state of the art and the possible future developments in relation to the 
use of AWS in domestic law enforcement.27  
 
27 For a comprehensive historical overview of the evolution of automation in weapons 
see M Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, 
and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt J 
Transnational L 1, 8-10. For more technical and technological information on autono-
mous weapons see R Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in Autonomous Robots (Chap-
man & Hall/CRC 2009) 7-27. 
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Before zooming in into this, it is necessary to clarify that, for the pur-
poses of this article, domestic law enforcement is meant to cover ‘tradi-
tional public forces or police services [...] with the primary objectives of 
maintaining law and order in civil society, and who are empowered by 
State to use force and/or special powers for these purposes’.28 It derives 
from that the following reflections are applicable if and when robots 
come to substitute for or be employed by law enforcement officials, as 
defined by the UN Code of Conduct.29 
It is also necessary to clarify what is meant by AWS. Daniele Amo-
roso, in his piece, devotes a section to explore what he calls ‘the defini-
tional conundrum’ of the concept of autonomy. He affirms, and I agree 
with him, that a technical and operative definition of AWS is counter-
productive, as what counts is the concept of ‘meaningful human control’. 
Against this, I will use in the present paper a categorization based on the 
level of human control exercised on weapons. Accordingly, the terms 
‘human-in-the-loop’, ‘humans on the loop’ and ‘human out of the loop’ 
will be employed to describe the level of automation of the machine: from 
the less to the full automated.30 
Indeed, armed robots (or drones) have already been employed in do-
mestic law enforcement scenarios, as happened in Dallas, in the United 
States, in 2016, when the police used a Northrop Grumman Remotec 
Andros, which is a remotely controlled bomb disposal robot, to deliver 
an explosive that killed an individual who was posing a threat to public 
order.31 This example does not prove much as the robot employed was 
 
28 This definition is coined by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: 
‘Recommendation Rec(2001)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
European Code of Police Ethics’ (2001) Rec(2001)10, Appendix.  
29 ‘The term “law enforcement officials” includes all officers of the law, whether ap-
pointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or deten-
tion’. See UNGA Res 169 ‘Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials’ (1979) 
GAOR 34th Session, art 1 (UN Code of Conduct). 
30 This is the approach followed by Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law Clinic 
in their joint 2012 Report. See HRW, IHRC (n 9) 2. See accordingly N Sharkey, ‘Staying 
in the Loop: Human Supervisory Control of Weapons’ in N Bhuta, S Beck, R Geiss, H-
Y Liu, C Kress (eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems. Law, Ethics, Policy (CUP 2016) 23, 
26-27. A similar approach is taken by M Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (n 27) 11-13. 
31 For more information, see PW Singer, ‘The Police Used a Robot to Kill – The Key 
questions’, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/09/opinions/dallas-robot-
questions-singer/index.html>. 
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remotely controlled; however, it is interesting to note how police forces 
in the US are more and more tempted to use machines in law enforce-
ment operations. Such a trend is demonstrated by the fact that a growing 
number of robots are due to be transferred from the Pentagon to US law 
enforcement agencies. According to public available information, these 
exchanges take place under what is known as the 1033 Program32, a De-
fense Logistics Agency Disposition Services (DLA) initiative to reutilize, 
transfer, donate, or sell excess military equipment to civil agencies. The 
1033 Program covers the transfer of a wide variety of usable property 
items each year, including many robots. While most of the robots that are 
acquired by police are intended primarily for bomb disposal, they may 
also be used for a variety of other missions such as reconnaissance and 
entering a building ahead of a squad.33 
The extreme variety of usages of AWS for law enforcement purposes 
is demonstrated by other concrete examples. One of this is represented 
by the AWS currently used by South Korea to guard the demilitarized 
zone that separate it from North Korea, the SGR-A1, developed by Sam-
sung.34 When the SGR-A1 notices an intruder, it can issue verbal warn-
ings and recognize surrender motions, such as if the target drops their 
weapon and raises their hands.35 It appears from many reports that the 
robot is capable of engaging with light machine guns any intruder who 
does not surrender after the warnings. Although disputed by Samsung, 
some commentators regard the robot as a ‘human on the loop’ one, mean-
ing that it can, in principle, decides on its own to shoot.36  
 
32 Defence Logistic Agency, ‘The 1033 Program’ available at <www.dla.mil/ 
DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/JoinTheProgram.aspx >. 
33 For a complete coverage of this data see Center for the Study of the Drone, ‘Law 
Enforcement Robots Datasheet’ (11 July 2016) <http://dronecenter.bard.edu/law-en-
forcement-robots-datasheet/>.  
34 See on this A Velez-Green, ‘The Foreign Policy Essay: The South Korean Sentry – 
A Killer Robot to Prevent War’ Lawfare (1 March 2015) <www.lawfareblog.com/ 
foreign-policy-essay-south-koreansentry%E2%80%94-killer-robot-prevent-war>. 
35 ibid. 
36 For an overview of the debate see M Brehm, ‘Defending the Boundary. Constraints 
and Requirements on the Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2017) Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Briefing no. 9, 44. 
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Robots are currently employed to patrol borders in other geographic 
areas, such as the line dividing Israel and Palestine along the Gaza Strip37 
and between the US and Mexico.38 
In May 2017, in Dubai, the first police robot was ‘recruited’ and un-
veiled to the world.39  At present, the machine developed by PAL Robot-
ics is capable of performing a limited number of functions, but, it would 
appear from the news that it can help in identifying wanted criminals and 
collecting evidence and it will patrol busy areas in the city; to do so, the 
robot is equipped with cameras and facial recognition systems.40 Appar-
ently, the first model of the ‘Dubai Robocop’ will not be alone for long 
as the Government’s intention is to increase both the number of ma-
chines and their tasks and duties.  
According to the latest news, India is also planning to deploy its first 
police robot in October. It will perform more or less the same functions 
as Dubai’s one, but the interesting thing about this model is that it will 
be probably also be available for private security.41 As it would appear 
from a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, the Indian Government is favourable to the employment of robots 
in domestic law enforcement and will increase their production in the 
upcoming years.42 
 
37 See N Schactman, ‘Robo-Snipers, “Auto Kill Zones” to Protect Israeli Borders’ 
Wired (6 April 2007) <www.wired.com/2007/06/for_years_and_y/>. Recently, the 
Israeli Government has begun to use autonomous vehicles to patrol the border with Gaza, 
apparently they are not armed; see J Rogers, ‘Robot patrol: Israeli Army to deploy 
autonomous vehicles on Gaza border’ (1 September 2016) Fox News available at 
<www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/09/01/robot-patrol-israeli-army-to-deploy-autonomous-
vehicles-on-gaza-border.html>. 
38 The Guardian, ‘Half of US-Mexico border now patrolled only by drone’ (13 
November 2014) <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/13/half-us-mexico-border-
patrolled-drone>. 
39 See BBC News, ‘Robot police officer goes on duty in Dubai’ (24 May 2017) 
<www.bbc.com/news/technology-40026940>; and Reuters, ‘Robocop joins Dubai police 
to fight real life crime’ (1 June 2017) <www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-robocop-
idUSKBN18S4K8>. 
40 ibid. 
41 The Times of India, ‘H-Bots Robotics in process of making a police-robot’ (5 July 
2017) <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/h-bots-robotics-in-
process-of-making-a-police-robot/articleshow/59460050.cms>. 
42 See R Shashank Reddy, ‘India and the Challenge of Autonomous Weapons’ (Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace June 2016) 10-13 <http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/files/CEIP_CP275_Reddy_final.pdf> 
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What precedes proves that automation will play a significant role in 
performing typical law enforcement activities, enhancing the capacity of 
a Government to search and detect suspects, to patrol borders, and more 
generally to ensure law and order.  
 
 
3. A broad impact 
 
In the introduction to this article, I noted that it is my intention to 
broaden the analysis on the human rights implications of the use of AWS. 
The protection of the right to life is the priority and that this will be the 
core issue to debate when an artificial intelligence capable of shooting to 
kill in a domestic scenario is employed for the first time.  
The writings that tackled the issue of the human rights implications 
of the use of AWS set as a priority the respect of the right to life and to 
bodily integrity, which is embodied in all human rights treaties, both at a 
universal and at a regional level43, and it is considered part of customary 
international law. The right to life is also of an absolute character, mean-
ing that derogations are not permitted even in time of emergency.44 
This is perfectly understandable: the right to life is deemed to be the 
cornerstone of the whole set of rules governing the use of force in law 
enforcement activities.45 As seen above, should machines be tasked with 
law enforcement duties, the life of civilians would be endangered by a 
decision-making process that will be affected by an unpredictable degree 
of autonomy. 
However, the use of lethal force – and the respect for the right to life 
– do not represent the only reason for concern.  
 
43 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA 
Res 217 A(III) art 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 6; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1955) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR) art 2; 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 
18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR) art 6; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 
217, art 4. 
44 UNCHR, ‘General Comment 6’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
(1994) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 176, para 1. 
45 See N Melzer, Targeted Killings in International Law (OUP 2009) 91 ff. 
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In fact, the logic of human rights is based on the relationship between 
an individual and the authority that exercises jurisdiction upon them. As 
Tomuschat pointed out, human rights ‘are designed to reconcile the ef-
fectiveness of state power with the protection against the same state 
power’.46  What is at stake here, therefore, is the relationship between 
States’ authority and individuals as a whole. The protection of the right 
to life is just part of a broader picture. 
As seen in section 2 of this article, the impact that AWS are going to 
have in the near future on domestic law enforcement will probably cover 
most – if not all – the dimensions of the exercise of States’ authority: from 
police operations involving the use of lethal force to patrolling activities 
across international borders or in crowded squares during a manifestation.  
Should this be the future, machines will be able to decide on their 
own on the basis of automated processes. Consequently, during such a 
process data will be collected, stored, analyzed and used through algo-
rithms. In fact, to take autonomous decisions, machines will probably 
decide on the basis of software that will help them in predicting the like-
lihood of a given scenario.47  
It seems reasonable to opine that when AWS are tasked with law en-
forcement duties, they must be aware of all the details of an operative 
scenario. Paradoxically, as we will see later,48 from the perspective of the 
protection of the right to life this would even be desirable, as a perfect 
understanding of a scenario is crucial to avoid violations of the right to 
life. This would inevitably imply a preliminary screening of individuals 
and places, which involves mass surveillance operations and an automatic 
processing of data.49  
What we are going to witness is a digitalization of law enforcement 
activities as a whole. Such a trend is not actually beginning with the in-
troduction of AWS. Data protection is at the core of a debate on the risks 
that new technologies poses on the enjoyment of the right to privacy; in 
 
46 C Tomuschat, Human Rights Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 8. 
47 This is admitted by anti-ban scholars and experts of artificial intelligence. See for 
example R Arkin (n 27) 30: robots will have the technical ability ‘of independently and 
objectively monitoring ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties and reporting in-
fractions that might be observed’. 
48 See infra, sec 4. 
49 See on this M Brehm (n 32) 52-54. 
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the European Union (EU) a through reform of EU data protection rules 
is feeding the discussion.50  
The employment of AWS can have a fueling impact on States’ re-
course to new technologies for law enforcement purposes, contributing 
to the so-call ‘bulk collection of data’: a practice consisting of the indis-
criminate collection of data that was recently addressed by the Obama 
administration in the US.51 
The impact of the use of AWS on the right to privacy might have a 
cascade effect on other rights. In fact, once AWS will be required to col-
lect and – eventually – store data, they will probably be equipped with 
software that will enable them to process such data. It cannot be ex-
cluded that such software will permit AWS to make predictions. Perhaps, 
they could be used to help in determining when the use of lethal force is 
necessary or proportionate.  
This scenario is even admitted by the scholars who do not call for a 
complete ban on AWS. Schmitt and Thurnher, in fact, refers to ‘pattern 
of life analysis’, which will enable machines to detect individuals who 
possess certain attributes.52 Such a conduct would probably constitute a 
‘profiling’ activity that according to a Council of Europe recommenda-
tion can be defined as:  
 
‘an automatic data processing technique that consists of applying a 
“profile” to an individual, particularly in order to take decisions con-
cerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal 
preferences, behaviours and attitudes.’53 
 
50 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (2016) OJ L 119/1. See also European Parliament and Council 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with re-
gard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JH (2016) OJ L 119/89. 
51 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Presidential Policy Directive 28 – Sig-
nal Intelligence Activities’ (17 January 2014) <https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidentiapolicy-directive-signals-intelligence-
activities>. 
52 MN Schmitt, JS Thurnher (n 3) 268.   
53 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal 
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Profiling of personal data would bear a risk of violating not only the 
right to life and the right to privacy, but also the right not to be discrim-
inated against,54 which is affirmed in all human rights treaties.55 
By way of concrete example, in the US, machines are currently used 
in criminal proceedings to determine the ‘level of risk’ of a defendant.56 
Only last year, in 2016, in Wisconsin a defendant appealed a judgment 
on the ground that he was convicted using data, which he was not allowed 
to challenge.57 Some commentators allege that an algorithmic-based de-
cision making process might be affected by a racist bias.58 The investiga-
tive journal ProPublica showed, for example, that machines used in trials 
are biased against black persons.59  
Should similar software be introduced in AWS which are used for 
law enforcement activities, the risk of discrimination would be high. 
 
 
4. Protecting the right to life as a priority 
 
Against the scenario depicted in section 2 and 3 it appears that the 
right to life plays a central role in the debate. As Christopher Heyns put 
it, the impact of AWS on the protection of the right to life in domestic 
law enforcement must be assessed on autonomous grounds, as IHL is not 
 
data in the context of profiling, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 November 
2010 at the 1099th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. See the Appendix at 1, e). 
54 See for example: UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (2015) UN 
Doc A/HRC/29/46. 
55 ICCPR (n 43) art 17; ECHR (n 43) art 8; ACHR (n 43) art 11. 
56 J Tashea, ‘Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now’ Wired 
(17 April 2017) <www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-
stop-now/>.  
57 M Smith, ‘In Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell Defendants’ 
Futures’ The New York Times (22 June 2016)  <www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/ 
us/backlash-in-wisconsin-against-using-data-to-foretell-defendants-futures.html>. 
58 J Dooris, ‘Killer Robots And Racist Software: Are There Decisions Only Humans 
Should Make?’ Huffington Post (10 July 2017)  <www.huffingtonpost.com.au/jason-
dooris/killer-robots-and-racist-software-are-there-decisions-that-only_a_23022933/>.. 
59 See J Angwin, J Larson, S Mattu, L Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias. There’s software used 
across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks’ ProPublica 
(23 May 2016) <www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing>. 
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applicable outside the context of armed conflicts.60 In domestic law en-
forcement, in fact, the use of lethal force by a Government is subjected to 
stricter rules than those applicable in the context of an armed conflict.61  
The rules governing the use of lethal force outside the context of an 
armed conflict are more demanding than those provided for by IHL. The 
standing point of IHL, in fact, is that killing is permissible and should 
only be regulated and not forbidden. Law enforcement officials, on the 
contrary, are deemed to ‘have a vital role in the protection of the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person.’62  Exceptions to this legal con-
struction must abide by the principles of legality, strict necessity, propor-
tionality and precaution.63  
Deprivation of life is only permitted if it happens within a legal frame-
work. The ICCPR and the ACHR employ the term ‘arbitrarily’ to identify 
those situations in which the deprivation of life is not tolerated. The 
ECHR is more detailed: ‘No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law’. The common denom-
inator of the three major human rights treaties is that deprivation of life 
could be tolerated only if it has a ‘sufficient legal basis’, which is the first 
requirement governing the use of force in IHRL.64 A ‘sufficient legal ba-
sis’ represents a demanding test; in fact, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
set the bar high and any law enforcement operation must not only be 
authorized by law, but also ‘sufficiently regulated by it’.65  
In the context of the protection of the right to life, therefore, national 
law should be publicly available, and must make the recourse to firearms 
dependent on a careful assessment of the circumstances including the 
nature of the offence committed, and the threat posed by the suspect or 
fugitive. Moreover, the national law regulating policing operations must 
 
60 C Heyns (n 20) 353. 
61 ibid.  
62 UN, ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials Adopted at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990’ (1990) UN 
Doc A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, 112, Preamble. 
63 ibid principle 5. 
64 See N Melzer, Targeted Killings (n 45) 100 and 116. 
65 ECtHR, Makaratzis v Greece App no 50385/99 (ECtHR (GC) 20 December 2004) 
para 11; see also Nachova and Others v Bulgaria App no 43577/98 (ECtHR (GC) 6 July 
2005) para 97. 
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secure a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness 
and abuse of force and even against avoidable accident.66 
In general, to be compatible with IHRL, domestic law must enable 
individuals to predict and to be protected against the use of lethal force 
by State agents.67 
Along with the principle of legality, the principle of strict necessity is 
of a central importance in the protection of the right to life. A deprivation 
can have a sufficient legal basis, but nonetheless it can be judged contrary 
to IHRL if it is not necessary. Necessity means that force should be used 
only as a means of last resort, when all other non-violent means fail.68 
Such a principle is enshrined in Article 2(2) of the ECHR69 and con-
firmed by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Although the ICCPR and 
ACHR do not explicit mention this principle, the practice of the Human 
Rights Committee70 and that of Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights71 join that of the European Court in affirming that deprivation of 
life must be necessary. This principle is also stated in the UN Code of 
Conduct: ‘Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly 
necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.’72 
Accordingly, lethal force can be used only against a person who is 
posing an imminent threat to the population or to the States’ agents in-
volved in an emergency situation. IHRL requires a careful factual assess-
ment of a scenario before deciding to employ lethal force. 
Finally, the use of deadly force must comply with the principle of 
proportionality, which requires States’ agents to choose means and meth-
ods to avoid excessive harm. More precisely, the principle of proportion-
ality calls for a value judgment of the relation between harm and benefit: 
 
66 Makaratzis (n 65) para 58. 
67 See N Melzer, Targeted Killings (n 45) 224. 
68 See C Heyns (n 20) 364; N Melzer, ‘Human Rights Implications’ (n 24) 31.  
69 ECHR (n 43) art 2(2): ‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary’. 
70 UNCHR, ‘Pedro Pablo Camargo v. Colombia’ (1982) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1, 
para 13.2. 
71 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on terrorism and human 
rights’ OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc 5 rev 1 corr (22 October 2002) paras 87-89. 
72 UN Code of Conduct (n 29) art 3. 
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lethal force might be necessary, but it should be employed only if the 
threat is sufficiently grave to justify the deprivation of life.73  
All the commentators that dealt with the compatibility of the use of 
AWS with the right to life highlighted that it would be very difficult for 
a machine to undergo a complex decision-making process, such as the 
one demanded by IHRL.74 This is particularly evident for completely au-
tonomous machines, where humans are ‘out of the loop’. However, this 
is also true for AWS that involve humans, in or on the loop.75  
At present, in fact, it is reasonable to doubt that robots will have the 
technical ability to assess properly if it is necessary to employ lethal force 
or if their action would be proportionate to the aim pursued. This is a 
major issue, which differentiates radically and significantly the discourse 
on the compatibility of AWS with IHRL from that under IHL. In the 
latter there is room for debate on the possibility that AWS will be able to 
respect the principle of distinction in the targeting decision making pro-
cess of machines.76 In the former discourse, the decision-making process 
is subject to more demanding requirements, in particular those repre-
sented by the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
 
 
5.   The extent to which the positive obligation to protect life apply to the 
use of AWS 
 
Another layer of discussion is represented by the nature of human 
rights obligations that States must fulfil in the field of human rights. It is 
known, in fact, that IHRL does not merely place limitations on the exer-
cise of States’ authority, but it also imposes positive duties on Govern-
 
73 The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is particularly instructive on 
the operation of this principle. See the judgment and decisions in the cases: McCann and 
Others v the United Kingdom App no 18984/91 (ECtHR (GC) 27 September 1995) para 
192; Nachova and others (n 65) para 95. See more recently Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy 
App no 23458/02 (ECtHR (GC) 24 March 2011) para 209. 
74 C Heyns (n 20) 366; N Melzer, ‘Human Rights Implications’ (n 24) 36. Similar 
conclusions can also be drawn from the debate on the compatibility of AWS with IHL. 
See for instance WH Boothby (n 3) 79-80, P Alston (n 3) 54, NE Sharkey, ‘The evitability 
of autonomous robot warfare’ 94 Intl Rev of the Red Cross 787, 789.  
75 See again N Melzer, ‘Human Rights Implications’ (n 24) ibid. 
76 See in this regard M Sassoli (n 14). 
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ments to protect individuals from human rights violations, and in partic-
ular from violations of the right to life.77 This obligation applies both 
when the harmful conduct is performed by a State’s agent or by a private 
person or entity78 and extends to ‘any activity, whether public or not, in 
which the right to life may be at stake.’79 
Such a duty has broadly been interpreted by the ECtHR, which has 
constantly affirmed that: 
 
‘The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for 
the purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary duty on the State to 
put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to pro-
vide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life’.80 
 
If applied to the use of AWS, the extent of the positive obligation of 
States to protect the right to life is dependent on the degree of automa-
tion of the machine. 
In cases of AWS that foresee a human control (whether in or on the 
loop), the Osman test developed by the ECtHR appears to be the appli-
cable one: States are responsible if they ‘knew or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual’.81 Accordingly, if the State’s agent that remotely 
controls a drone or a robot notices an imminent threat to the life of a 
person, he or she should intervene to halt the machine. This duty imposes 
on Governments, as a corollary, the duty to plan, organize and control a 
law enforcement operation to minimize the use of lethal force. To the 
 
77 See in general on this issue R Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Responsabilité de l’État pour vio-
lation des obligations positives relatives aux droits de l’homme’ (2006) 333 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 390 ff. 
78 See Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 31. The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26 May 2004) para 8. Human Rights Committee, ‘CCPR 
General Comment No 6: Article 6 (Right to Life)’ (30 April 1982) para. 3: ‘The Commit-
tee considers that States parties should take measures not only to prevent and punish 
deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own se-
curity forces’. 
79 Öneryildiz v Turkey App no 48939/99 (ECtHR (GC) 30 November 2004) para 71. 
80 ibid para 89. 
81 Osman v the United Kingdom App no 23452/94 (ECtHR (GC) 28 October 1998) 
para 116; Demiray v Turkey App no 27308/95 (ECtHR (GC) 21 November 2000) para 
45. 
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same end, this also implies that law enforcement officials must be trained 
to cope with emergency scenarios.82  
Should the AWS be completely autonomous (‘humans out of the loop’ 
model), the positive obligation to protect life could in principle entail a 
duty to avoid malfunctioning in the machines’ performance. During the 
Fifth Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, it was highlighted that  
 
‘one of the dangers is that these weapons could lead to strategies diluting 
or concealing true responsibilities in case of collateral damages. If armed 
machines provoke such damages it is easy and tempting, on the part of 
those who use them, to invoke technical malfunctions rather than face 
their responsibility.’83 
 
The positive obligation to prevent loss of life should therefore bind 
States to constantly monitor the correct functioning of AWS. This ap-
pears to be a manifestation of the principle of due diligence to prevent 
human rights violations.84 
In the case of AWS, one might wonder whether the principle of due 
diligence can force States to scrutinize the performance of the machines 
from the moment of their inception and, therefore, to liaise manufactur-
ers in order to avoid the development of machines that could potentially 
act contrary to human rights. This appears to be a far-reaching conclu-
sion, as it would impose a disproportionate burden on States in relation 
to the transfer of arms as a whole.85 However, it is clear that the positive 
obligation to protect life should bind States to a pro-active review of the 
AWS at their disposal. 
Last, but not least, the positive obligations of States to protect life 
entail a duty to investigate into an alleged deprivation of life. Although it 
is clear in the case law of international courts that this is an obligation of 
 
82 Nachova and Others (n 65) para 97; see also the Court’s criticism of the ‘shoot to 
kill’ instructions given to soldiers in McCann and Others (n 74) paras 211-214. 
83 Comments Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
Working Paper submitted by the Holy See, 7 April 2016, 2. 
84 See again R Pisillo Mazzeschi (n 77) 394, specifically. See also from the same Au-
thor: ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of 
States’ (1992) 35 German YB Intl L 9. See also RP Barnidge Jr, ‘The Due Diligence 
Principle Under International Law’ (2006) 8 Intl Community L Rev 81. 
85 See accordingly M Brehm, ‘The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect 
for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2008) 12 J Conflict & Security L 359, 382-
383. 
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means and not an obligation of result,86 investigations must be immedi-
ate, exhaustive and impartial, as well as independent in hierarchical, in-
stitutional and practical terms.87 The draft General Comment on the right 
to life goes even further by requesting that ‘investigations into allegations 
of violation of article 6 must always be independent, impartial, prompt, 
thorough, effective, credible and transparent.’88 This means that investiga-
tions can either be publicly available or result in securing accountability.89 
Applying the duty to investigate in cases of lethal, or quasi-lethal, in-
cidents might prove to be a difficult task for States if completely auto-
mated machines are to be employed. Indeed, accountability would hardly 
be secured as it is not feasible to envisage a ‘court for robots’ as machines 
cannot be punished.90 Proposals to hold accountable commanders and 
programmers have already been criticized as incompatible with the mens 
rea requirement.91 
The least a Government can do is to properly assess the decision-
making process that leads to civilian casualties. However, would an ex-
planation based on complex probabilistic and algorithmic analytics be 
acceptable for the relatives of a victim?92  
 
 
 
 
86 R Pisillo Mazzeschi (n 77) 414-417. The ECtHR put it clearly in Kelly and Others v 
United Kingdom App no 30054/96 (ECtHR (GC) 4 May 2001) para 96. The same ap-
proach is adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in  
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 
No 4 (29 July 1988) paras 176-177. 
87 This is confirmed in international jurisprudence: See, for example, Isayeva, 
Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia (n 26) para 210; Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Report No. 55/97, Case No 11.137: Argentina, OEA/ Ser/L/V/II.98, Doc 38 (6 
December 1997) para 412.  
88 ‘General comment No 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, on the right to life, Advance Unedited Version’ <www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/GCArticle6_EN.pf>. 
89 Özkan and Others v Turkey (ECtHR 6 April 2004) para 314. 
90 See HRW (n 23) 19. See more in depth on this issue R Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’ 
(2007) 24 J Applied Philosophy 62, 72. 
91 For a discussion on this see D Amoroso, G Tamburrini (n 13) 6-7. See also HRW 
(n 9) 20. 
92 See on this J Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks:” Understanding Opacity in Ma-
chine Learning Algorithms’ (2016) 3 Big Data & Society 1. See also infra, sec 7. 
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6.   AWS and data collection: the content of the duty to respect the right to 
privacy 
 
As seen in section 3 of this article, the human rights implications of 
the use of AWS do not only regard the protection of the right to life. I 
have tried to explain that AWS could fuel a bulk collection of data and 
this could have tremendous repercussions on the right to privacy and, 
consequently, on democracy.93 A failure to protect such a right would 
cause a cascade effect on other fundamental freedoms, as discriminatory 
conduct might not be excluded. 
The debate related to the impact of technological evolution on the 
right to privacy is topical, as recent States’ programmes are showing a 
dangerous attitude towards the treatment of personal data. The evolution 
of technologies, in fact, allows private and public entities to collect and 
store individual data. It is no coincidence that the Human Rights Council 
appointed, in 2015, a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy94 and 
that the United Nations General Assembly approved, in 2013, a resolu-
tion on this delicate topic.95  
The major issues of concern regarding the right to privacy in the digital 
age lie with the constant and rapid technological development, which is go-
ing to enable individuals all over the world to use new information and com-
munication technologies and at the same time enhances the capacity of gov-
ernments to undertake surveillance, interception and data collection.96  
According to IHRL, limitations on the right to privacy can take place 
only if States’ measures respect the principle of legality, legitimacy and 
proportionality. 
The principle of legality is the most important among the parameters 
for evaluating States’ interference with the enjoyment of human rights.97 
In fact, human rights violations or limitations can be justified only if they 
 
93 Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR (GC) 6 September 1978) 
para 49: ‘the Court stresses that this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an 
unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance. The 
Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying 
democracy on the ground of defending it’. 
94 HRC, ‘Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council’ (2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/28/16. 
95 UNGA, ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ (2014) UN doc A/RES/68/167. 
96 ibid. 
97 C Tomuschat (n 46) 93-94. 
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are grounded on a law that can be accessible to individuals. This is a gen-
eralized principle which is common in all human rights treaties. The 
ACHR put it clearly and generally in Article 30:  
 
‘The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on 
the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein 
may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons 
of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such 
restrictions have been established.’98 
 
The ICCPR and the ECHR do not have such a general clause but 
nonetheless the principle of legality is mentioned in relation to the single 
rights listed therein.99 
Interferences with fundamental freedoms and, in our specific case, 
the right to privacy can be tolerated only if ‘they take place on the basis 
of law’.100 The legality test requires that ‘relevant legislation must specify 
in detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be 
permitted’(emphasis added).101 This is confirmed in the jurisprudence of 
international courts, and in particular in that of the ECtHR that intro-
duced the concept of the ‘quality of the law’, adding that ‘there must be 
a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interfer-
ences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 
[of Article 8 of the ECHR]’ (emphasis added).102 
States are asked to pay attention to the revision of their existing laws 
in order to cope with the evolution of modern technologies. This has 
been recently affirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while coun-
tering terrorism in its 2014 Annual Report to the General Assembly.103 
 
98 ACHR (n 43) art 30. 
99 ECHR (n 43) art 8(2). The ICCPR (n 43) in art 17 prohibits ‘arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy’ (emphasis added). 
100 UNCHR, ‘General Comment No. 16’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ (1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, vol I, 191, para 4. 
101 ibid para 8. 
102 See for example Rotaru v Romania App No 28341/95 (ECtHR (GC) 4 May 2000) 
para 55. 
103 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ (2014) UN Doc 
A/69/397 para 35 ff. 
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The Special Rapporteur did not simply reaffirm one of the requisites of 
the so-called ‘quality of the law’ principle, firmly established in the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR, but went a little further affirming that: 
 
‘A public legislative process provides an opportunity for Governments 
to justify mass surveillance measures to the public. Open debate enables 
the public to appreciate the balance that is being struck between privacy 
and security. A transparent law-making process should also identify the 
vulnerabilities inherent in digital communications systems, enabling us-
ers to make informed choices [...] it is also a valuable means of ensuring 
effective public participation in a debate on a matter of national and 
international public interest.’104 
 
A legal basis is not the only requirement for considering acceptable a 
limitation on the right to privacy. In fact, interferences must pursue a 
legitimate aim and be proportional.  
The first requirement is usually interpreted by international courts in a 
broad sense. Law enforcement activities seeking to maintain public order 
are normally regarded as legitimate aims that justify a limitation of the right 
to privacy. However, this approach was recently challenged by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression, who stated that:  
 
‘The use of an amorphous concept of national security to justify invasive 
limitations on the enjoyment of human rights is of serious concern. The 
concept is broadly defined and is thus vulnerable to manipulation by the 
State’.105 
 
This is an interesting statement for the purposes of the present in-
quiry. In fact, if AWS were to be deployed for a constant surveillance 
action, the law enforcement justification would be perennial and, as a 
result, individuals would be subjected to a constant monitoring activity 
by their Governments.106 
 
104 ibid para 39. 
105 UNCHR, ‘Report of Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression’ (2013) 
UN Doc A/HRC/23/40 para 58. 
106 In this regard, the words of Christopher Heyns in his 2013 Report are rather par-
adigmatic: ‘The danger here is that the world is seen as a single, large and perpetual bat-
tlefield and force is used without meeting the threshold requirements. LARs could aggra-
vate these problems.’ See UNCHR (n 21) para 83. See also and accordingly A Oddenino, 
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International courts – and in particular the ECtHR –, on the contrary, 
have discussed deeply the requirement of proportionality, according to 
which a limitation on the right to privacy is tolerable only when there are 
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. The assessment that the 
European Court usually makes depends on all the circumstances of a 
given case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible 
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities com-
petent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law.107  
Recently, the ECtHR delivered some important judgments that spec-
ify the content of States’ obligation to respect privacy in the context of 
their surveillance programs.  
In the Szabo and Vissy v Hungary case, the Court declared that the 
Hungarian anti-terrorist surveillance legislation was contrary to the 
ECHR because it had enabled the Government to use new technologies 
to intercept masses of data without offering any reasonable guarantee to 
individuals.108 In the Zakharov v Russia judgment, the Court found that 
Russian legal provisions governing interception of communications did 
not provide for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness 
and the risk of abuse. For example, critical factors were identified in the 
circumstances in which public authorities in Russia are empowered to 
resort to secret surveillance measures; in the duration of such measures; 
in the procedures for authorising interception as well as for storing and 
destroying the intercepted data; and, finally, in the supervision mecha-
nism of the interception.109  
The case-law of the ECtHR seems to pose an undeniable burden on 
States. If they want to employ AWS in the performance of law enforce-
ment duties, they should strictly regulate the collection of data to which 
 
‘La violazione dei sistemi informatici contenenti informazioni riservate come illecito in-
ternazionale: tra dimensione interstatuale e tutela dei diritti umani’ in M Di Stefano (a 
cura di), La protezione dei dati personali ed informatici nell’era della sorveglianza globale 
(Editoriale Scientifica 2017) 13, 14-15. 
107 Klass et al (n 93) para 50. 
108 Szabo and Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR (GC) 12 January 2016) para 
82. 
109 Roman Zakharov v Russia App no 47143/06 (ECtHR (GC) 4 December 2015) para 
231. 
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machines will inevitably contribute. Should AWS carry out mass surveil-
lance, States must provide a clear and accessible legislative framework for 
preventing this system from abuse. 
Furthermore, enforcement duties performed by AWS might see the 
involvement of private companies. At present, this is normal practice in 
the treatment of data and indeed. It happens frequently, with data often 
being stored by private actors and requested by States when needed.110 
As regards EU Member States, their responsibility in the context of data 
protection will be regulated from 2018 by the newly adopted General Data 
Protection Regulation.111 Although it is too early to assess the impact of the 
Regulation, for the purposes of the present analysis it is worth mentioning 
that, through its implementation, a number of important rights would be 
granted to individuals. For example, the right to object at any time to the 
processing of data (Article 21) and the right not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing of data (Article 22) seem to offer to 
individuals a wide-ranging protection.  
 
 
7.    An appraisal 
 
In this article, I have tried to evaluate the impact of the use of AWS 
on human rights. As I said in the introductory section, I performed this 
evaluation assuming that a general pre-emptive ban will not be adopted. 
I focused my analysis on the right to life and on the right to privacy on 
the assumption that AWS could have particular implications here, not 
only because they could decide to use lethal force on the basis of algo-
rithmic decision-making processes, but also because, in the course of 
such processes, individuals’ data can inevitably be mistreated.  
The results of the analysis allow some final reflections to be proposed.  
Both the right to life and the right to privacy demand a regulation of 
the use of AWS in domestic law enforcement that must meet the ‘quality 
of the law’ threshold. A threshold that is met by domestic laws that are 
accessible, that make future Governmental actions predictable and that 
 
110 A Haase, E Peters, ‘Ubiquitous computing and increasing engagement of private 
companies in governmental surveillance’ (2017) 7 Intl Data Privacy L 126 ff. 
111 See supra sec 3. 
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provide adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. In other words, 
laws that make the recourse to AWS ‘transparent’.112  
A call for transparency has already been made by several Govern-
ments of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons in 2015113 and by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Article 
36 and Amnesty International.114 Christopher Heyns, in his capacity as 
UN Special Rapporteur, has already brought the attention of the UN to 
the issue of transparency in his 2013 Report, recommending that ‘it will 
be important to ensure that transparency, accountability and the rule of 
law are placed on the agenda from the start’ and emphasizing ‘the need 
for full transparency regarding all aspects of the development of robotic 
weapon systems’.115 
As regards the use of AWS in domestic law enforcement, as seen, 
although no weapons’ review mechanisms are foreseen in IHRL, a duty 
of reviewing the use of new weapons can be considered as necessary for 
meeting the ‘quality of the law’ requirement. 
Be that as it may, a call for more transparency does not offer any solu-
tion to the issue of accountability raised in section 5 and in the final part of 
section 6 of this piece. The demands for justice by relatives of civilians 
killed as a result of the conduct of AWS will likely remain unanswered. Or, 
and this is even worse, the answer may be totally unintelligible, making it 
impossible to understand the process that led to a certain event. The same 
 
112 See, generally, S Knuckey, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems and Transparency: To-
wards an International Dialogue’ and  N Bhuta, S-E Pantazopoulos, ‘Autonomy and 
Uncertainty: Increasingly Autonomous Weapons Systems and the International Legal 
Regulation of Risk’ in N Bhuta, S Beck, R Geiss, H-Y Liu, C Kress (eds) (n 30) 164 ff and 
284, 299. See also M Sassoli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian 
Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 90 
Intl L Studies 308, 338.  
113 Germany, statement on Transparency to the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (17 April 2015); Sweden, statement on 
Transparency and the Way Forward to the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (17 April 2015); Ghana, statement to the 2015 CCW 
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (17 April 2015). 
114 Article 36, ‘Structuring debate on autonomous weapons systems: memorandum 
for delegates to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ (November 2013) 3; 
Amnesty International, ‘Moratorium on fully autonomous robotics weapons needed to 
allow the UN to consider fully their far-reaching implications and protect human rights’, 
written statement to the twenty-third session of the UN Human Rights Council (22 May 
2013); HRW (n 23) 47. 
115 UNCHR (n 21) paras 111 and 115. 
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goes for all the individuals whose data will be collected by AWS for law 
enforcement duties; a right to obtain an explanation, in fact, does not seem 
to exist even in the EU General Data Protection Regulation. 116 
In April 2017, the Science and Technology Committee of the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom launched an inquiry into algorithmic deci-
sion-making.117 The written evidence received so far from technology ex-
perts are interesting. One expert says that ‘Algorithms used in decision-
making can be too complex to describe in clear English’ and ‘Data used in 
algorithms can go through multiple levels of abstraction such that it is im-
possible to determine the original input’.118 Another expert proposes the 
introduction of a ‘lingua franca’ that Institutions should adopt ‘to explain 
their decisions in cases where humans are affected and involved [...] to 
make sure that non-experts, courts and media can understand what went 
on.’119 Finally, an expert warns that ‘alone, transparency mechanisms can 
encourage false binaries between “invisible” and “visible” algorithms, fail-
ing to enact scrutiny on important systems that are less visible’.120 
Transparency, therefore, is not enough if it leads to unintelligible 
sources. It may satisfy the principle of legality, but it does not help, as 
such, to ensure accountability.  
It may well be the starting point of the debate on law reforms that in 
an unpredictable future will require the adaption of the uses and the 
abuses of AWS to reach human rights standards. 
 
116 See accordingly S Wachter, B Mittelstadt, L Floridi, ‘Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regula-
tion’ (2017) 7 Intl Data Privacy L 76 ff. 
117 See <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/ 
science-and-technology-committee/news-parliament-2015/algorithms-in-decision-making-
inquiry-launch-16-17/>. 
118 Written evidence submitted by Dr Janet Bastiman (ALG0029) <http://data.par-
liament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-
technology-committee/algorithms-indecisionmaking/written/68990.html>. 
119 Written evidence submitted by Simul Systems Ltd (ALG0007) <http://data.par-
liament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-
technology-committee/algorithms-indecisionmaking/written/49780.html>. 
120 Written evidence submitted by Dr Alison Powell (ALG0067) <http://data.parlia-
ment.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-tech-
nology-committee/algorithms-indecisionmaking/written/69121.html>. 
